NOE S. ANDAYA, G.R. No. 168486
Petitioner,
Present:
Panganiban, C.J. (Chairperson),
- versus - Ynares-Santiago,
Austria-Martinez,
Callejo, Sr., and
Chico-Nazario, JJ.
PEOPLE OF THE
Respondent. Promulgated:
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YNARES-SANTIAGO,
J.:
This is a petition for review on
certiorari from the September 29, 2004 Decision[1] of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 26556, affirming the January 29, 2002
Decision[2] of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 104 of Quezon City in Criminal Case No.
92-36145, convicting petitioner Noe S. Andaya of falsification of private document,
and the April 26, 2005 Resolution[3]
denying the motion for reconsideration.
Complainant Armed Forces and Police
Savings and Loan Association, Inc. (AFPSLAI) is a non-stock and non-profit
association authorized to engage in savings and loan transactions. In 1986, petitioner Noe S. Andaya was elected
as president and general manager of AFPSLAI. During his term, he sought to increase the
capitalization of AFPSLAI to boost its lending capacity to its members. Consequently, on
In a letter[4]
dated September 1991, the Central Bank wrote Gen. Lisandro C. Abadia, then Chairman
of the Board of Trustees, regarding the precarious financial position of AFPSLAI
due to its alleged flawed management. As
a result, Gen. Abadia requested the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to
conduct an investigation on alleged irregularities in the operations of AFPSLAI
which led to the filing of several criminal cases against petitioner, one of
which is the instant case based on the alleged fraudulent implementation of the
Finder’s Fee Program.
On
The
undersigned accuses NOE S. ANDAYA of the crime of Estafa thru Falsification of
Commercial Document, committed as follows:
That
on or about the 8th day of April, 1991 in Quezon City, Philippines,
the above-named accused, with intent to
gain, by means of deceit, false pretenses and falsification of commercial
document, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud the
ARMED FORCES AND POLICE SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, INC., represented by its
Chairman of the Board of Director[s], Gen. Lisandro C. Abadia, AFP, in the
following manner, to wit: on the date and in the place aforementioned the said
accused being then the President and General Manager of the Armed Forces and
Police Savings and Loan Association, Inc., caused and approved the disbursement
of the sum of P21,000.00, Philippine Currency, from the funds of the association, by then and there making
it appear in Disbursement Voucher No. 58380 that said amount represented the 1%
finder’s fee of one DIOSDADO J. GUILLAS [Guilas]; when in truth and in fact
accused knew fully well that there was no such payment to be made by the
association as finder’s fee; that by virtue of said falsification, said accused
was able to encashed (sic) and received (sic) MBTC Check No. 583768 in the sum
of P21,000.00, which amount once in his possession, misapplied, misappropriated
and converted to his own personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the said offended party in the
aforesaid sum of P21,000.00, Philippine Currency.
CONTRARY
TO LAW.[5]
(Emphasis supplied)
The case was raffled to Branch 104 of
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City and docketed as Criminal Case No.
92-36145. On
The prosecution presented two
witnesses, namely, Diosdado Guilas and Judy Balangue.
Guilas, a general clerk of AFPSLAI’s
Time Deposit Section, testified that on
Balangue also testified that on
The defense presented three
witnesses, namely, Emerita Arevalo, Ernesto Hernandez and petitioner.
Arevalo, secretary of petitioner in
AFPSLAI, explained that the finder’s fee was for the P2,100,000.00 investment
solicited by Ernesto Hernandez from Rosario Mercader. The finder’s fee was placed in the name of
Guilas upon request of Hernandez so that the same would not be reflected in his
(Hernandez’s) income tax return. She
alleged that Guilas consented to the arrangement of placing the finder’s fee in
his (Guilas’) name. She also claimed
that there was no prohibition in the Finder’s Fee Program regarding the substitution
of the name of the solicitor as long as there was no double claim for the finder’s
fee over the same investment.
Hernandez, an associate member of
AFPSLAI and vice president of Philippine Educational Trust Plan, Inc. (PETP
Plans), testified that sometime in 1991, he was able to solicit from Rosario
Mercader an investment of P2,100,000.00 in AFPSLAI. He also asked petitioner to place the
finder’s fee in the name of one of his employees so that he (Hernandez) would
not have to report a higher tax base in his income tax return. On
Petitioner denied all the charges
against him. He claimed that the
P21,000.00 finder’s fee was in fact payable by AFPSLAI because of the P2,100,000.00
investment of Rosario Mercader solicited by Ernesto Hernandez. He denied misappropriating the P21,000.00
finder’s fee for his personal benefit as the same was turned over to Ernesto
Hernandez who was the true solicitor of the aforementioned investment. Since the finder’s fee was in fact owed by
AFPSLAI, then no damage was done to the association. The finder’s fee was
placed in the name of Guilas as requested by Hernandez in order to reduce the
tax obligation of the latter. According
to petitioner, Guilas consented to the whole setup.
Petitioner also claimed that Hernandez
was an associate member of AFPSLAI because his application for membership was approved
by the membership committee and the Board of Trustees and was in fact issued an
I.D. There was no prohibition under the
rules and regulation of the Finder’s Fee Program regarding the substitution of
the name of the solicitor with the name of another person. On cross-examination, petitioner claimed that
he merely approved the substitution of the name of Hernandez with that of
Guilas in the disbursement voucher upon the request of Hernandez. He brushed aside the imputation of condoning
tax evasion by claiming that the issue in the instant proceedings was whether
he defrauded AFPSLAI and not his alleged complicity in tax evasion.
After the defense rested its case,
the prosecution presented two rebuttal witnesses, namely, Ma. Victoria Maigue
and Ma. Fe
Maigue, membership affairs office
supervisor of AFPSLAI, testified that Hernandez was ineligible to become a
member of AFPSLAI under sections 1 and 2 of Article II of the association’s
by-laws. However, she admitted that the
application of Hernandez as member was approved by the membership committee.
The defense dispensed with the
presentation of Mercader in view of the stipulation of the prosecution on the
fact that Mercader was a depositor of AFPSLAI and that she was convinced to
invest in the association by Ernesto Hernandez.[10]
On
Petitioner proceeded to submit
documentary evidence consisting of the financial statements of AFPSLAI from
1996 to 1999 to show that AFPSLAI did not suffer any damage from the payment of
the P21,000.00 finder’s fee. He likewise
offered the testimony of Paterno Madet, senior vice president of AFPSLAI, who testified
that he was personally aware that Rosario Mercader invested P2,100,000.00 in
AFPSLAI; that Hernandez was a member of AFPSLAI and was the one who convinced
Mercader to invest; that the finder’s fee was placed in the name of Guilas;
that petitioner called him to grant the request of Hernandez for the finder’s
fee to be placed in the name of one of the employees of AFPSLAI; that there was
no policy which prohibits the placing of the name of the solicitor of the
investment in the name of another person; that the substitution of the name of
Hernandez with that of Guilas was approved by petitioner but he (Madet) was the
one who approved the release of the disbursement voucher.
On January 29, 2002, the trial court
rendered the assailed Decision convicting petitioner of falsification of
private document based on the following findings of fact: Hernandez solicited
from Rosario Mercader an investment of P2,100,000.00 for AFPSLAI; Hernandez
requested petitioner to place the finder’s fee in the name of another person; petitioner
caused it to appear in the disbursement voucher that Guilas solicited the
aforesaid investment; the voucher served as the basis for the issuance of the
check for P21,000.00 representing the finder’s fee for the investment of
Mercader; and Guilas encashed the check and turned over the money to petitioner
who in turn gave it to Hernandez.
The trial court ruled that all the
elements of falsification of private document were present. First, petitioner caused it to appear in the
disbursement voucher, a private document, that Guilas, instead of Hernandez,
was entitled to a P21,000.00 finder’s fee. Second, the falsification of the voucher was
done with criminal intent to cause
damage to the government because it was meant to lower the tax base of
Hernandez and, thus, evade payment of taxes on the finder’s fee.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but
was denied by the trial court in an Order[15] dated
Preliminarily, petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals contradicted
the ruling of the trial court. He claims
that the Court of Appeals stated in certain portions of its decision that petitioner
was guilty of estafa through falsification of commercial document whereas in the
trial court’s decision petitioner was convicted of falsification of private
document.
A close reading of the Court of Appeals’ decision shows that
the alleged points of contradiction were the result of inadvertence in the
drafting of the same. Read in its
entirety, the decision of the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court and, necessarily, it affirmed
the conviction of petitioner for the crime of falsification of private document
and not of estafa through falsification of commercial document.
In the main, petitioner implores this Court to review the
pleadings he filed before the lower courts as well as the evidence on record on
the belief that a review of the same will prove his innocence. However, he failed to specify what aspects of
the factual and legal bases of his conviction should be reversed.
Time honored is the principle that an appeal in a criminal
case opens the whole action for review on any question including those not
raised by the parties.[16] After a careful and thorough review of the
records, we are convinced that petitioner should be acquitted based on
reasonable doubt.
The elements of falsification of private document under Article
172, paragraph 2[17] in
relation to Article 171[18]
of the Revised Penal Code are: (1) the offender committed any of the acts of
falsification under Article 171 which, in the case at bar, falls under
paragraph 2 of Article 171, i.e.,
causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding
when they did not in fact so participate; (2) the falsification was committed
on a private document; and (3) the falsification caused damage or was committed
with intent to cause damage to a third party.
Although the public prosecutor designated the offense charged
in the information as estafa through falsification of commercial document, petitioner
could be convicted of falsification of private document, had it been proper,
under the well-settled rule that it is the allegations in the information that
determines the nature of the offense and not the technical name given by the
public prosecutor in the preamble of the information. We explained this principle in the case of U.S. v. Lim San[19] in this wise:
From a legal point of view, and in a very real sense, it is
of no concern to the accused what is the technical name of the crime of which
he stands charged. It in no way aids him in a defense on the merits. x x x That
to which his attention should be directed, and in which he, above all things
else, should be most interested, are the facts alleged. The real question is
not did he commit a crime given in the law some technical and specific name,
but did he perform the acts alleged in the body of the information in the
manner therein set forth. x x x The real and important question to him is, “Did
you perform the acts alleged in the manner alleged?” not, “Did you commit a
crime named murder?” If he performed the acts alleged, in the manner stated,
the law determines what the name of the crime is and fixes the penalty therefor.
x x x If the accused performed the acts
alleged in the manner alleged, then he ought to be punished and punished
adequately, whatever may be the name of the crime which those acts constitute.[20]
The facts alleged in the information are
sufficient to constitute the crime of falsification of private document. Specifically, the allegations in the
information can be broken down into the three aforestated essential elements of
this offense as follows: (1) petitioner caused it to appear in Disbursement
Voucher No. 58380 that Diosdado Guillas was entitled
to a finder’s fee from AFPSLAI in the amount of P21,000.00 when in truth and in
fact no finder’s fee was due to him; (2) the falsification was committed on Disbursement
Voucher No. 58380; and (3) the falsification caused
damage to AFPSLAI in the amount of P21,000.00.
The first element of the offense charged in the
information was proven by the prosecution. The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, namely,
Diosdado Guilas and Judy Balangue, as well as the presentation of Disbursement Voucher No. 58380 established that petitioner
caused the preparation of the voucher in the name of Guilas despite knowledge
that Guilas was not entitled to the finder’s fee. Significantly, petitioner admitted his participation in falsifying the voucher when
he testified that he authorized the release of the voucher in the name of
Guilas upon the request of Ernesto Hernandez. While petitioner did not personally prepare the voucher, he could be considered a
principal by induction, had his conviction been proper, since he was the
president and general manager of AFPSLAI at the time so that his employees
merely followed his instructions in preparing the falsified voucher.
The second element of the offense charged in the
information, i.e., the falsification
was committed in Disbursement
Voucher No. 58380, a private document, is likewise present.
It appears that the public prosecutor erroneously
characterized the disbursement voucher as a commercial document so that he
designated the offense as estafa through falsification of commercial document
in the preamble of the information. However,
as correctly ruled by the trial court,[21]
the subject voucher is a private document
only; it is not a commercial document because it is not a document used
by merchants or businessmen to promote or facilitate trade or credit
transactions[22] nor is
it defined and regulated by the Code of Commerce or
other commercial law.[23]
Rather, it is a private document, which has
been defined as a deed or instrument executed by a private person without the
intervention of a public notary or of other person legally authorized, by which
some disposition or agreement is proved, evidenced or set forth,[24]
because it acted as the authorization for the release of the P21,000.00
finder’s fee to Guilas and as the receipt evidencing the payment of this finder’s
fee.
While the first and second elements of the
offense charged in the information were satisfactorily established by the
prosecution, it is the third element which is decisive in the instant case. In the information, it was alleged that petitioner caused
damage in the amount of P21,000.00 to AFPSLAI because he caused it to appear in
the disbursement voucher that Diosdado Guilas was entitled to a P21,000.00 finder’s
fee when in truth and in fact AFPSLAI owed no such sum to him. However, contrary to these allegations in the
information, petitioner was able to prove that
AFPSLAI owed a finder’s fee in the amount of P21,000.00 although not to Guilas but
to Ernesto Hernandez.
It was positively shown that Hernandez was able
to solicit a P2,100,000.00 worth of investment for AFPSLAI from Rosario
Mercader which entitled him to a finder’s fee equivalent to one percent of the
amount solicited (i.e., P21,000.00)
under the Finder’s Fee Program. The
documentary evidence consisting of the Certificate of Capital Contribution Monthly
No. 52178[25] which was presented by the prosecution categorically stated
that Rosario Mercader deposited P2,100,000.00 worth of investment in AFPSLAI. In fact, Rosario Mercader was no longer
presented as a defense witness in view of the stipulation by the prosecution on
the fact that Mercader was a depositor of AFPSLAI and that Hernandez was the
one who convinced her to make such deposit.[26]
Moreover, the defense showed that the
disbursement voucher was merely placed in the name of Guilas upon the request
of Hernandez so that he would have a lower tax base. Thus, after Guilas received the P21,000.00
from AFPSLAI, he gave the money to petitioner who
in turn surrendered the amount to Hernandez.
It was further established that Hernandez was an
associate member of AFPSLAI and, thus, covered by the Finder’s Fee Program. The prosecution tried to cast doubt on the
validity of Hernandez’s membership in the association but it merely relied on
the unsubstantiated claims of its two rebuttal witnesses, namely, Ma. Victoria Maigue, membership affairs office supervisor of AFPSLAI and Ma.
Fe Moreno, legal officer of AFPSLAI, who claimed that Hernandez
was disqualified from being an associate member under AFPSLAI’s by-laws. However, except for a recital of certain
provisions of the by-laws, they failed to support their claims with documentary
evidence clearly showing that Hernandez was disqualified from being an
associate member. Significantly, Maigue admitted on cross-examination that Hernandez’s membership
was approved by AFPSLAI’s membership committee and was issued an AFPSLAI I.D.
card.[27]
Documentary evidence consisting of Hernandez’s
I.D. card as well as the oral testimonies of petitioner, Arevalo and Hernandez, and the admission of Maigue on
cross-examination, support the claim of the defense that Hernandez was an
associate member of AFPSLAI.
Considering that Hernandez was able to solicit a P2,100,000.00
investment from Mercader, it follows that he was entitled to receive the
finder’s fee in the amount of P21,000.00. AFPSLAI suffered no damage because it really
owed the P21,000.00 finder’s fee to Hernandez albeit the sum was initially paid
to Guilas and only later turned over to Hernandez. Clearly then, the third essential element of
the offense as alleged in the
information, i.e., the falsification
caused damage to AFPSLAI in the amount of P21,000.00, was not proven by the prosecution.
In all criminal prosecutions, the burden of proof
is on the prosecution to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt.[28]
It has the duty to prove each and every element of the crime charged in
the information to warrant a finding of guilt for the said crime or for any
other crime necessarily included therein. However, in the case at bar, the prosecution
failed to prove the third essential element of the crime charged in the
information. Thus, petitioner should
be acquitted due to insufficiency of evidence.
The trial court convicted petitioner of falsification of
private document, while conceding that AFPSLAI suffered no damage, however, the
court reasoned that the third essential element of falsification of private
document was present because the falsification of the voucher was done with criminal intent to cause damage to the
government considering that its purpose was to lower the tax base of
Hernandez and, thus, allow him to evade payment of taxes on the finder’s fee.
We find ourselves unable to agree with this ratiocination of
the trial court because it violates the constitutional right[29] of
petitioner to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
As early as
the 1904 case of U.S. v. Karelsen,[30]
the rationale of this fundamental right of the accused was already explained in
this wise:
The object
of this written accusation was – First. To furnish the accused with such a
description of the charge against him as will enable him to make his defense;
and second, to avail himself of his conviction or acquittal for protection
against a further prosecution for the same cause; and third, to inform the
court of the facts alleged, so that it may decide whether they are sufficient in
law to support a conviction, if one should be had. (
It is fundamental that every element constituting the offense
must be alleged in the information. The
main purpose of requiring the various elements of a crime to be set out in the information
is to enable the accused to suitably prepare his defense because he is presumed
to have no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense.[32] The allegations of facts constituting the offense charged are substantial
matters and an accused’s right to question his conviction based on facts not
alleged in the information cannot be waived.[33] No matter how conclusive and convincing the
evidence of guilt may be, an accused cannot be convicted of any offense unless
it is charged in the information on which he is tried or is necessarily
included therein.[34] To convict him of a ground not
alleged while he is concentrating his defense against the ground alleged would
plainly be unfair and underhanded.[35] The rule is that a
variance between the allegation in the information and proof adduced during
trial shall be fatal to the criminal case if it is material and prejudicial to
the accused so much so that it affects his substantial rights.[36]
Thus, in Alonto
v. People,[37] Dico v. Court of Appeals[38]
and Ongson v. People,[39]
we acquitted the accused for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (“The
Bouncing Checks Law”) because there was a variance between the identity and
date of issuance of the check alleged in the information and the check proved by
the prosecution during trial:
This Court notes, however, that under the third count, the
information alleged that petitioner issued a check dated
Similarly, in the case of Burgos v. Sandiganbayan,[41]
we upheld the constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the accusation
against him in a case involving a variance between the means of committing the violation
of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 alleged
in the information and the means found by the Sandiganbayan:
Common and foremost among the issues raised by petitioners
is the argument that the Sandiganbayan erred in convicting them on a finding of
fact that was not alleged in the information.
They contend that the information charged them with having allowed
payment of P83,850 to Ricardo Castañeda despite being aware and knowing
fully well that the surveying instruments were not actually repaired and
rendered functional/operational.
However, their conviction by the Sandiganbayan was based on the finding
that the surveying instruments were not repaired in accordance with the
specifications contained in the job orders.
x x x x
In criminal cases, where the life and liberty of the
accused is at stake, due process requires that the accused be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him. An accused cannot be convicted
of an offense unless it is clearly charged in the complaint or
information. To convict him of an
offense other than that charged in the complaint or information would be a
violation of this constitutional right.
The important end to be accomplished is to describe the act
with sufficient certainty in order that the accused may be appraised of the
nature of the charge against him and to avoid any possible surprise that may
lead to injustice. Otherwise, the accused would be left in the unenviable state
of speculating why he is made the object of a prosecution.
x x x x
There is no
question that the manner of commission alleged in the information and the act
the Sandiganbayan found to have been committed are both violations of Section
3(e) of R.A. 3019. Nonetheless, they are
and remain two different means of execution and, even if reference to Section
3(e) of R.A. 3019 has been made in the information, appellants’ conviction
should only be based on that which was charged, or included, in the
information. Otherwise, there would be a
violation of their constitutional right to be informed of the nature of the accusation against them.
In Evangelista
v. People, a judgment of conviction by
the Sandiganbayan, for violation of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, was reversed by the Court on the ground that accused was made
liable for acts different from those described in the information. The accused therein was convicted on the
finding that she failed to identify with certainty in her certification the
kinds of taxes paid by Tanduay Distillery, Inc., although the information
charged her with falsifying said certificate.
The Court said that, constitutionally, the accused has a right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against her. To convict her
of an offense other than that charged in the complaint or information would be
a violation of this constitutional right.
Contrary to
the stand of the prosecution, the allegations contained in the information and
the findings stated in the Sandiganbayan decision are not synonymous. This is clearly apparent from the mere fact
that the defenses applicable for each one are different. To counter the allegations contained in the
information, petitioners only had to prove that the instruments were repaired
and rendered functional/operational.
Under the findings stated in the Sandiganbayan decision, petitioners’
defense would have been to show not only that the instruments were repaired,
but were repaired in accordance with the job order.
x x x x
This is not to say that petitioners cannot be convicted
under the information charged. The information in itself is valid. It is
only that the Sandiganbayan erred in convicting them for an act that was not
alleged therein. x x x.[42] (Underscoring supplied)
As in the Burgos
case, the information in the case at bar is valid, however, there is a variance between the allegation in
the information and proof adduced during trial with respect to the third essential
element of falsification of private document, i.e., the
falsification caused damage or was committed with intent to cause damage to a
third party. To reiterate, petitioner was charged in the information with causing damage to
AFPSLAI in the amount of P21,000.00 because he caused it to appear in the disbursement
voucher that Guilas was entitled to a P21,000.00 finder’s fee when in truth and
in fact AFPSLAI owed no such amount to Guilas. However, he was convicted by the
trial court of falsifying the voucher with criminal intent to cause damage to
the government because the trial court found that petitioner’s acts were designed to lower the tax base of Hernandez
and aid the latter in evading payment of taxes on the finder’s fee.
We find this variance material and prejudicial to
petitioner which, perforce, is fatal to his conviction in the instant
case. By the clear and
unequivocal terms of the information, the prosecution endeavored to prove that
the falsification of the voucher by petitioner caused damage to AFPSLAI in the amount of P21,000.00 and not that the falsification of the
voucher was done with intent to cause
damage to the government. It is
apparent that this variance not merely goes to the identity of the third party but,
more importantly, to the nature and extent of the damage done to the third
party. Needless to state, the defense
applicable for each is different.
More to the point, petitioner prepared his defense based
precisely on the allegations in the information. A review of the records shows that petitioner concentrated
on disproving that AFPSLAI suffered damage for this
was the charge in the information which he had to refute to prove his innocence.
As previously discussed, petitioner
proved that AFPSLAI suffered no damage inasmuch as it
really owed the finder’s fee in the amount of P21,000.00 to Hernandez but the
same was placed in the name of Guilas upon Hernandez’s request. If we were to convict petitioner now
based on his intent to cause damage to the government, we would be riding
roughshod over his constitutional right to be informed of the accusation because
he was not forewarned that he was being prosecuted for intent to cause damage
to the government. It would be simply
unfair and underhanded to convict petitioner on this ground not alleged
while he was concentrating his defense against the ground alleged.
The surprise and injustice visited upon petitioner becomes more
evident if we take into consideration that the prosecution never sought to
establish that petitioner’s acts were done with intent to cause damage to the
government in that it purportedly aided Hernandez in evading the payment of
taxes on the finder’s fee. The Bureau of
Internal Revenue was never made a party to this case. The income tax return of Hernandez was, likewise,
never presented to show the extent, if any, of the actual damage to the
government of the supposed under declaration of income by Hernandez. Actually,
the prosecution never tried to establish actual damage, much less intent to
cause damage, to the government in the form of lost income taxes. There was
here no opportunity for petitioner to object to the evidence presented by the
prosecution on the ground that the evidence did not conform to the allegations
in the information for the simple reason that no such evidence was presented by
the prosecution to begin with.
Instead, what the trial court did was to deduce intent to cause
damage to the government from the testimony of petitioner and his three other witnesses,
namely, Arevalo, Hernandez and Madet, that the substitution of the names in the
voucher was intended to lower the tax base of Hernandez to avoid payment of
taxes on the finder’s fee. In other
words, the trial court used part of the defense of petitioner in establishing the
third essential element of the offense which was entirely different from that alleged
in the information. Under these
circumstances, petitioner obviously had no opportunity to defend himself with
respect to the charge that he committed the acts with intent to cause damage to
the government because this was part of his defense when he explained the
reason for the substitution of the names in the voucher with the end goal of establishing
that no actual damage was done to AFPSLAI. If we were to approve of the method employed
by the trial court in convicting petitioner, then we would be sanctioning the surprise
and injustice that the accused’s constitutional right to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him precisely seeks to prevent. It would
be plain denial of due process.
In view of the foregoing, we rule that it was error to
convict petitioner for acts which purportedly constituted the third essential
element of the crime but which were entirely different from the acts alleged in
the information because it violates in no uncertain terms petitioner’s constitutional
right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
No doubt tax evasion is a deplorable
act because it deprives the government of much needed funds in delivering basic
services to the people. However, the culpability of petitioner should have been
established under the proper information and with an opportunity for him to adequately
prepare his defense. It is worth
mentioning that the public prosecutor has been apprised of petitioner’s defense
in the counter-affidavit[43]
that he filed before the NBI. He claimed
there that AFPSLAI really owed the P21,000.00 finder’s fee not to Guilas but to
Hernandez and that the finder’s fee was placed in the name of Guilas under a
purported financial arrangement between petitioner and Guilas. Yet in his Resolution[44]
dated
In closing, it is an opportune time
to remind public prosecutors of their important duty to carefully study the
evidence on record before filing the corresponding information in our courts of
law and to be vigilant in identifying and rectifying errors made. Mistakes in filing the proper information and in
the ensuing prosecution of the case serve only to frustrate the State’s
interest in enforcing its criminal laws and adversely affect the administration
of justice.
WHEREFORE, the
petition is GRANTED. The September 29, 2004 Decision and April 26,
2005 Resolution of the Court Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 26556 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner is ACQUITTED based on reasonable doubt. The Bail Bond is CANCELLED.
SO ORDERED.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
Chairperson
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.
Associate Justice Associate Justice
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ARTEMIO
V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
[1] Rollo, pp. 82-100. Penned by Associate Justice Amelita G.
Tolentino and concurred in by Associate Justices Roberto A. Barrios and Vicente
S.E. Veloso.
[2]
[3]
[4]
Records, pp. 44-47.
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
SEC. 24. Reopening. At any time
before finality of the judgment of conviction, the judge may, motu proprio or upon motion, with
hearing in either case, reopen the proceedings to avoid a miscarriage of
justice. The proceedings shall be terminated within thirty (30) days from the
order granting it.
[15] Rollo, pp. 520-521.
[16] People v. Yam-id, 368 Phil. 131, 137
(1999).
[17]
Art. 172. Falsification by private
individuals and use of falsified documents. The penalty of prisión correccional in its medium and
maximum periods and a fine of not more than 5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon:
x x x x
2. Any
person who, to the damage of a third party, or with the intent to cause such
damage, shall in any private document commit any of the acts of falsification
enumerated in the next preceding article.
x x x x.
[18]
Art. 171. Falsification by public
officer, employee or notary or ecclesiastic minister.— The penalty of prisión mayor and a fine not to exceed
5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any public officer, employee, or notary who,
taking advantage of his official position, shall falsify a document by
committing any of the following acts:
1.
Counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting, signature
or rubric;
2.
Causing it to appear that persons have participated in
any act or proceeding when they did not in fact so participate;
3.
Attributing to persons who have participated in an act
or proceeding statements other than those in fact made by them;
4.
Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts;
5.
Altering true dates;
6.
Making any alteration or intercalation in a genuine
document which changes its meaning;
7.
Issuing in an authenticated form a document purporting
to be a copy of an original document when no such original exits, or including
in such copy a statement contrary to, or different from, that of the genuine
original; or
8.
Intercalating any instrument or note relative to the
issuance thereof in a protocol, registry, or official book.
The same
penalty shall be imposed upon any ecclesiastical minister who shall commit any
of the offenses enumerated in the preceding paragraph of this article, with
respect to any record or document of such character that its falsification may
affect the civil status of persons.
[19]
17 Phil. 273 (1910).
[20]
[21] Citing People v.
Francisco, C.A. No. 05130-41-CR, August 23, 1966, 64 O.G. 537, 541,
cited in Luis B. Reyes, THE REVISED
PENAL CODE, Book II (14th ed., 1998), p. 234. In People v. Francisco, the Court of
Appeals ruled that “the cash disbursement vouchers here in question are not
negotiable instruments nor are they defined and regulated by the Code of
Commerce. They are nothing more than receipts evidencing payment to borrowers
of the loans extended to them and as such are private documents only.”
[22] Monteverde v. People, 435 Phil. 906, 921
(2002), citing Luis B. Reyes, THE REVISED PENAL CODE, Book II (14th
ed., 1998), p. 236, citing People v.
[23]
Luis B. Reyes, THE REVISED PENAL CODE, Book II (14th ed., 1998), p.
235, citing People v. Co Beng,
[24]
[25]
Records, p. 186.
[26]
[27]
TSN,
[28] People v. Caiñgat, 426 Phil. 782, 792
(2002).
[29]
CONSTITUTION, Article III, Section 14(2).
[30] 3
Phil. 223 (1904).
[31]
[32] Balitaan v. Court of First Instance of
Batangas, Branch 11, 201 Phil. 311, 323 (1982).
[33]
[34]
[35] People v. Pailano, G.R. No. 43602,
[36]
41 Am Jur 2d § 259, pp. 863-864.
[37]
G.R. No. 140078,
[38]
G.R. No. 141669,
[39]
G.R. No. 156169,
[40] Alonto v. People, supra at 640-641.
[41] Supra note 34.
[42]
[43]
Records, pp. 19-20.
[44]
[45]
The public prosecutor reasoned thus: “We cannot give credence to the
protestation of witness for respondent[,] Hernandez[,] that he was able to
convince and solicit money from Mrs. Rosario Mercader. We may still believe
this if it were a transaction done singly or a couple of times, but the records
show that this has become a plan, a scheme through deceitful means to obtain
money thus through the years caused a drain to AFPSLAI of its much needed
funding. Because of this, Central Bank of the AFPSLAI commenting adversely upon
respondent’s actuations in allowing the dissipation of the Association’s assets
thus resulting in a few years of its total collapse. Mrs. Mercader was not
called upon to explain if she really was an investor. In cases where
corroboration is required, it must be done, otherwise the party will lose his
cause where the testimony of a witness is contradicted and the fact sought to
be proved is important, corroboration is necessary x x x.”
[46]
SEC. 19. When mistake has been made in
charging the proper offense.— When it becomes manifest at any time before
judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper offense and the
accused cannot be convicted of the offense charged or of any other offense
necessarily included therein, the accused shall not be discharged if there
appears to be good cause to detain him. In such case, the court shall commit
the accused to answer for the proper offense and dismiss the original case upon
the filing of the proper information.
[47]
See People v. Uba, 99 Phil. 134
(1956).